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Means, Ends and Original Intent: A Response to
Charles Cooper
by Michael Wells*
Charles Cooper believes that the ninth amendment should be
read at once more broadly and more narrowly than it is today. In
his view, the intent of the Framers was to cabin the power of the
federal government. By taking note in the ninth amendment of
rights other than those enumerated in the first eight, they sought to
ensure that the national government would not exercise powers be-
yond those listed in the Constitution. Since the aim of the ninth
amendment was to keep the federal government one of limited
power, it is inappropriate to apply the amendment to the states, in
whose hands the general police power was meant to remain. The
federal government has long since shed the shackles placed upon it
by the Framers, and some judges and scholars would invoke the
ninth amendment as a source of rights against state governments.
Each of these developments flouts the intent of the Framers, and
their intent should govern the disposition of constitutional questions.
So goes Cooper's argument.
This account of the ninth amendment stands somewhere between
the two major contemporary positions regarding its scope. On the
one hand are liberal constitutional theorists like Gene Nichol and
Lawrence Tribe, who view the ninth amendment as a rich source of
rights against both state and national governments. Nichol, for ex-
ample, conceives of the ninth amendment as an expression of the
libertarian ideals of Thomas Jefferson.' On the other side of the
Professor of Law, University of Georgia.
Nichol, Children of Distant Fathers: Sketching an Ethos of Constitutional Liberty, 1985 Wis. L.
Rev. 1305, 1311-16; see also L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 569-72 (1978) (viewing the
ninth amendment as protecting a rational continuum of rights rather than limited to protecting those
enumerated in the first eight amendments).
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debate one finds Raoul Berger and others who style themselves as
guardians of the Framers' intent. They maintain that the ninth
amendment was not enacted in order to recognize any constitutional
rights, but merely to declare the existence of rights that might be
protected by state law and that are subject to defeasance by either
the national or state governments.2 Cooper shares their premise that
the intent of the Framers is dispositive and agrees that the ninth
amendment does not bind the states. He breaks ranks with them
over whether it has any teeth at all; the ninth amendment was in-
tended, he insists, to limit the power of the national government.3
I share Cooper's apparent distaste for our ever more powerful
and intrusive national government and I find his vision of federal-
ism an alluring one. Imagine a world in which the Supreme Court
had strictly limited the federal government to the functions set forth
for it in the constitutional text, and had permitted states a free hand
outside the area explicitly reserved for the federal government. Con-
gress could invoke the power over interstate commerce only to en-
hance trade and remove state-created barriers to trade, but not as a
pretext for economic and social legislation.4 Similarly, since the
commerce power is assigned to Congress and not the courts,3 the
Supreme Court could not invalidate state laws in the absence of a
federal statute under the "negative commerce clause." 6 Had the
United States followed this path, the national government would be
much weaker than it is today, and states correspondingly stronger.
In the absence of a powerful national government and the pressure
it exerts toward uniformity, there would be more marked political
and cultural diversity among states. At the same time, and in accor-
dance with the Framers' intent, a national government, although
weak, would act against the erection of harmful barriers to trade
and migration by the states.
In this vision, the United States might resemble the modern Eu-
See, e.g., Berger, The Ninth Amendment, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1980); Caplan, The History and
Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 69 Va. L. Rev. 223 (1983).
1 See also J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust 36-38 (1980) (discussing the "incorporation" issue).
4 See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100 (1941).
8 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
' See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137
(1970).
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ropean Economic Community. The advantage of such a federation
would lie not only in its diversity but also in the safeguards it pro-
vides against oppression. No one member state could easily deprive
its citizens of liberty, since these citizens could easily flee to another
state. Each of the member states would have an interest in seeing to
it that none of the others became too powerful. The liberty of the
people would be ensured not by words written in declarations of
rights, in which James Madison had little faith, but in the incessant
struggle among competing governments."
American federalism did not develop as Cooper thinks the Fram-
ers intended, or as I would have liked. Starting with the Marshall
Court and continuing with occasional divagations to the present, the
Supreme Court has upheld congressional power to legislate on any-
thing it pleases,8 and has often reined in the states even where Con-
gress has not sought to do so.9 Even in areas where states retain
nominal control, they generally lack the will to resist federal pres-
sure. Thus, even though state participation in the social security
system is nominally voluntary, no state is able to resist the federal
dollars that participation brings its citizens and the resulting politi-
cal pressure for joining. Witness, too, the recent capitulation by
most states when faced with loss of federal highway money if they
did not lower speed limits and raise the drinking age. The United
States has developed into a nation rather than a federation.
Cooper's complaint about these developments differs from mine,
and the difference must be stressed. In my view, our society would
be better off with a weak national government. Cooper's criticism,
on the other hand, is based on the belief that Congress and the
Supreme Court have breached their duty to adhere to the intent of
the Framers. For him, the Framers' intent is the guiding principle
of constitutional interpretation; even if we are better off with a
strong national government, that government is illegitimate because
it contravenes the intent of the Framers.
One could challenge Cooper's account of the ninth amendment on
two traditional grounds. He might be wrong in determining the in-
See The Federalist No. 10 and No. 51 (J. Madison).
8 See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (upholding broad
congressional power to regulate the actions of state governments).
' See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
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tent of the Framers, or he might be wrong on the question of
whether their intent should be dispositive. A large literature is de-
voted to each of these issues," and I have no insights to add to it. In
this response, I will assume that Cooper is correct on both of these
matters. Accordingly, I am prepared (very cheerfully) to grant
Cooper's indictment of our strong national government. Rather than
take this traditional approach, I focus instead on the second aspect
of Cooper's thesis, in which he rejects application of the ninth
amendment to the states. Even if Cooper is right about the Framers'
intent and its relevance, this part of his thesis is open to attack.
Most arguments in favor of adhering to the intent of the Fram-
ers, including Cooper's, are carried on at a high level of abstraction
and do not take much account of inconvenient facts. It is a fact that
the vision of the national government set forth by Cooper, as one of
strictly limited powers, is a pipe dream. Over time the government
in Washington will only grow bigger and stronger, as it has
throughout our history. During liberal eras it will intrude more into
the economic life of the people. As the current administration has
shown, in conservative times it will shift its attention to the social
and moral betterment of the citizenry. The momentum sometimes
slows down or stalls, but it never changes direction for very long.
No court would ever dare tell -this government that it cannot use the
commerce clause for purposes other than regulating commerce. Any
court that tried would be ignored, packed with compliant judges, or
deprived of jurisdiction.
These observations provide important context in evaluating
Cooper's claim that the ninth amendment should not be applied to
the states. If the Framers intended to protect liberty by structural
means, cabining the national government and having the states con-
trol one another, then it is easy to see why they would not have
intended application of the ninth amendment to the states. It was
necessary to lodge general police power somewhere and the compe-
l* On the Framers' intent in drafting the ninth amendment, see the works cited supra notes 1 - 3,
and sources cited therein. On the debate over the significance of the framers' intent, see, e.g.,
Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353 (1981); Brest, The Misconceived Quest
for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. Rev. 204 (1980); Powell, The Original Understanding of
Original Intent, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 885 (1985); Berger, "Original Intention" in Historical Perspective,
54 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 296 (1986); Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Inter-
pretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 781 (1983).
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tition among states would limit abuses by them. Today, however,
the Framers' design has gone awry. The national government is the
powerful force opponents of the constitution feared it would be-
come, in derogation of the clauses specifying its powers and in the
face of the ninth amendment.
Nor is this the only departure from the intent of the Framers.
The Civil War and the constitutional amendments adopted in its
wake fundamentally altered the relationship between the national
government and the states. For the first time, significant constitu-
tional restrictions were placed upon state power over personal lib-
erty.11 These developments marked a shift away from governmental
structure as a means of defending liberty, and towards rights writ-
ten down in the constitution or in judicial opinions, and largely en-
forced by the courts. However flimsy and untrustworthy this
method may be, it is what we have today.
Given this history, the following question must be posed: Does
fidelity to the Framers' intent require us to adhere to their decision
to restrict only national power, and not apply the ninth amendment
to the states? Cooper apparently thinks so, and this is where I part
company with him. In my opinion it is nonsense to insist myopically
on fulfilling one part of a constitutional blueprint when other inte-
gral parts of the same design can never be restored. The compo-
nents of the Framers' system fit together into a governmental struc-
ture where liberty could thrive. Now the structure lies in ruins.
Liberty is threatened by a strong national government that can im-
pose its will upon the states whenever it pleases. The states them-
selves are increasingly homogenous and have become habituated to
national control. Enervated by the incessant growth of federal
power, many of them have lost the fiesty libertarian spirit that
animated the revolutionary era. There is not one shred of evidence
in the origins of the ninth amendment that the Framers would have
intended to limit its reach to the national government under current
conditions. In light of the importance they attached to liberty, they
would likely have recoiled in horror at the collapse of their finely
wrought structural safeguards against governmental abuse of power.
They would probably have been willing to resort to any available
" See G. Gunther, Constitutional Law 408-09 (1 1th ed. 1985).
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means of protecting the individual against government, including
the judicial elaboration of rights against not only the federal govern-
ment but also the states. In any event, this account of how the
Framers would respond to our current predicament is at least as
plausible as the explanation of their intent offered by Cooper, Ber-
ger, and other conservatives.
In short, to be faithful to the Framers' intent it is necessary to
engage in a somewhat more sophisticated analysis than the one of-
fered by Cooper.12 We must distinguish between ends and means.
The limitation of the amendment to the national government and its
strict constraints on that government are both rules of an opera-
tional nature. They implement one of the Framers' central aims: to
curb the abuse of governmental power. For better or worse, we have
abandoned the Framers' structural plan for achieving this vital goal.
Cooper would have us cling to those remnants of the Framers' de-
sign which might still be observed, as if the plan were all that mat-
tered, and not the objects it sought to obtain. In this Cooper re-
minds me of the fourteenth century French nobility, who insisted
that the way to fight a battle was with armored knights in the van-
guard, even after the English longbowmen had clobbered them
again and again."
It may well be that a broad reading of the ninth amendment is
unwise, because the amendment gives courts no guidance and hence
leaves too much to judges' subjective judgment, or because demo-
cratic values deserve a higher place in our constitutional scheme
than judicial protection of minority rights, or for some other reason.
My point is that Cooper's argument for the "intent of the Framers"
is not a convincing one.
Another point needs to be made about Cooper's reliance on the
Framers' intent, one which has nothing to do with the merits of the
argument itself. I do not believe that Cooper is as obtuse as I have
made him out to be. Indeed, I have been unjust to the medieval
French nobility as well. The real agenda of the French nobles was
not blind adherence to past methods at whatever price. They knew
that building an army of longbowmen would mean bringing large
Is Cf. Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 Va. L. Rev. 659, 674-75 (1987) ("The founders' com-
ments on constitutional issues always are parts of a larger historical and intellectual whole.").
Is C.W.C. Oman, The Art of War in the Middle Ages 116, 124-37 (Beeler ed. 1953).
HeinOnline  -- 4 J.L. & Pol. 86 1987-1988
Response to Charles Cooper
numbers of ordinary people into the fighting force, and they fore-
saw the consequences. Not only would the knights' prestige dimin-
ish," but also the upstart vilains would demand a share of the po-
litical power.' 5 Better to let the English ravage the countryside and
pillage the towns.
Perhaps I am too cynical, but I suspect Cooper has an agenda of
his own, unrelated to the need for fidelity to the Framers' intent.
The New Right, of which I count Cooper a member, can often be
found exhorting us to follow the Framers' intent, or to practice
strict construction, when the issue is whether to extend constitu-
tional or statutory protection beyond the literal bounds of some cen-
tury or two-century-old provision. 6 But where are they when the
issue is whether to read the eleventh amendment literally and in
accord with the expressed intent of the Framers?' 7 There is good
evidence that the eleventh amendment was intended to immunize
states only against suits under state law by out-of-staters.18 Yet the
Supreme Court reads it more broadly to bar many suits brought
under federal law, 9 and one hears not a murmur of protest about
this instance of judicial activism from Cooper and his kind.
To take another example, the terms of the Civil Rights Act of
1871 impose a very broad cause of action against state officers. Both
the language"0 and the legislative history' of the statute suggest
14 Id. at 125.
" Cf. B. Tuchman, A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous Fourteenth Century 155-84 (1978) (dis-
cussing the loss of confidence in the French nobility after the disastrous Battle of Poitiers in 1356, and
the ensuing efforts of the peasants and bourgeois to obtain power).
"' See, e.g., Address by Attorney General Edwin Meese before the American Bar Association (July
9, 1985), reprinted in The Federalist Society, Occasional Paper No. 2, The Great Debate: Interpret-
ing Our Written Constitution 9 (1986).
17 U.S. Const. amend. XI states:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
's See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 247-302 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
19 E.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234; Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
(1974); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress
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that the Framers intended to allow no defense based on official im-
munity. The statute was directed at the oppression of blacks in the
South after the Civil War, and a modern reading faithful to the
intent of its Framers would permit no immunity defense in suits
charging racial discrimination.2" Nevertheless, the Court recognizes
stringent immunity defenses, 3 and neither Cooper nor anyone else
on the New Right has spoken out against this judicial arrogation of
power. It is hard to resist the inference that Cooper invokes the
intent of the Framers not because he sincerely believes their intent
should be dispositive, but because it makes a good weapon in some
substantive debates. 4 What really matters to Cooper and others
may not be the intent of the Framers, but the usual aim of rulers: to
curb civil liberties and restrict remedies for governmental wrongs by
any available means.
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered a statute of the
District of Columbia.
Note the absence of any reference to immunity.
11 The legislative history contains at least three uncontradicted assertions that no immunity defense
would apply. See Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. at 365-666 (Rep. Arthur); id. at 385 (Rep.
Lewis); id. app. at 217 (Sen. Thurman).
22 See Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical Study, 67 Cornell L. Rev.
482, 484-522 (1982).
'" See, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (absolute immunity for judges); Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420-31 (1976) (absolute immunity for prosecutors); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416
U.S. 232 (1974) (qualified immunity for executive officials); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367
(1951) (absolute immunity for legislators).
"' This manipulative tendency is characteristic of political discourse and is by no means restricted
to the New Right. For more examples, see Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law, in H. Wechsler, Principles, Politics & Fundamental Law 17-20 (1961).
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